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Abstract  This  paper  analyses  the  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  value  creation.  It  relies
upon a  dataset  that  includes  the  companies  listed  on  the  Spanish  Stock  Exchange  for  the  period
from 2005  to  2012.  Attention  is  focused  on  the  structure  and  composition  of  boards.  In  particular,
four variables  are  analyzed:  BOARD  SIZE,  BOARD  INDEPENDENCE,  BOARD  DILIGENCE  (measured
by the  number  of  meetings),  and  DUALITY  (chairman  and  chief  executive  ofﬁcer  being  the  same
person).  Over  the  period  of  the  deepest  economic  crisis  (2009--2012)  the  most  signiﬁcant  varia-
bles that  had  a  positive  effect  on  value  creation  were  BOARD  INDEPENDENCE  and  BOARD  SIZE.
Hence, the  global  ﬁnancial  crisis  has  highlighted  the  need  for  effective  corporate  governance.
Policy makers  should  think  about  translating  the  recommendations  of  the  Good  Governance
Codes into  legislation  (mandatory),  to  improve  corporate  governance.Board;
Economic  crisis;
Independence
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Financial  scandals  (Enron,  Parmalat,  Tyco,  WorldCom,  and
others)  have  led  to  an  increasing  interest  in  the  relationship
between  corporate  governance  and  ﬁrm  performance  when
control  mechanisms  are  challenged.  In  this  context,  the∗ Corresponding author at: Faculty of Business and Tourism, Cam-
pus Universitario, 32004 Ourense, Spain.
E-mail addresses: monicavv@uvigo.es (M. Villanueva-Villar),
rivo@uvigo.es (E. Rivo-López), slagop@uvigo.es (S. Lago-Pen˜as).
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).oard  is  considered  to  be  a  mechanism  for  corporate  gover-
ance,  assigned  the  task  of  protecting  and  increasing  assets
nd  maximizing  the  return  on  corporate  investments  (Castro
t  al.,  2010;  Silva  et  al.,  2011;  Huang  et  al.,  2012;  Rossi
t  al.,  2015).  The  board  becomes  the  main  internal  con-
rol  mechanism  for  companies,  allowing  agency  problems
rising  from  the  separation  of  ownership,  and  manage-
ent  control  problems  that  cause  information  asymmetries,o  be  overcome.  In  this  way,  the  board  serves  as  a  link
etween  shareholders  and  the  management  team,  with
upervision  as  its  main  task;  it  sometimes  plays  a disciplinary
ole,  replacing  executives  when  there  is  poor  or  negative
 an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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effects  of  the  recession.  In  the  ﬁnancial  markets,  the  IBEX
351 lost  50%  of  its  value  between  2010  and  mid-2012  (BME,
2007-2014).
1 ‘‘The IBEX 35® is the index made up by the 35 most liquid
securities traded on the Spanish Market, used as a domestic and34  
erformance.  Therefore,  the  literature  mainly  analyses
oard  size  and  board  composition  as  characteristics  that
nﬂuence  the  supervisory  capacity  of  the  board.  In  line  with
his,  the  different  codes  set  out  a  series  of  recommendations
n  the  ideal  structure  and  composition  of  boards.
For  this  reason,  the  drafting  and  implementation,
hrough  national  laws  and  regulations,  of  corporate  gover-
ance  codes  signiﬁcantly  increased  at  the  beginning  of  the
ew  millennium  (He  et  al.,  2009).  Nowadays,  more  than  sixty
ountries  have  drafted  codes  for  good  governance.  Com-
anies,  as  well  as  countries,  seek  to  make  their  corporate
overnance  practices  more  effective,  in  part  because  of  cor-
orate  governance  scandals,  but  also  to  attract  investors
Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2009).  Worldwide,  codes
rovide  sets  of  recommendations  that  listed  companies
hould  take  into  account  when  issuing  their  annual  reports
n  corporate  governance.  In  particular,  they  include  several
ey  universal  principles  for  effective  corporate  governance,
o  achieve  a  balance  between  executive  and  non-executive
irectors  and  a  clear  division  of  responsibilities  between  the
hairman  and  the  chief  executive  ofﬁcer.
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  analyze  the  effect  of
oard  composition  and  structure  on  ﬁrm  performance  under
dverse  economic  conditions.  It  involves  studying  whether
oard  size,  CEO  --  chairman  duality,  board  independence  and
he  frequency  of  board  meetings  are  relevant  for  a  company.
e  propose  as  main  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  direct  effect
f  board  on  ﬁrm  value  under  adverse  economic  conditions.
he  idea  is  clear-cut:  the  board  of  directors  is  much  less
elevant  when  market  conditions  are  favourable,  and  when
arket  conditions  are  not,  the  board  is  crucial  in  explaining
ifferences  in  value  creation.  To  test  this  set  of  hypotheses,
e  have  carried  out  an  econometric  study  using  panel  data
or  listed  companies  on  the  Spanish  Stock  Exchange  over  the
eriod  2005--2012.
Our  results  conﬁrm  the  idea  that  board  structure  and
omposition  are  far  more  relevant  in  difﬁcult  and  chal-
enging  times.  Moreover,  the  number  of  independent  board
embers  and  the  board  size  are  signiﬁcant  variables  during
 crisis  period,  having  a  positive  effect  on  value  creation.
hese  results  allow  us  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that
ompanies  should  worry  about  their  board  structure  and
omposition  when  economic  conditions  are  adverse.  With
egards  to  composition,  the  bigger  the  board  size,  the  bet-
er  the  performance  of  the  company  during  the  crisis  period.
egarding  structure,  companies  should  bear  in  mind  that  the
reater  the  independence  of  the  board,  the  greater  the  ﬁrm
alue;  furthermore,  in  order  for  the  board  members’  pres-
nce  to  be  sufﬁciently  relevant  for  them  to  inﬂuence  board
ecisions,  it  is  not  only  the  number  of  board  members  that
s  important,  but  also  the  relative  weight  of  independent
embers.
From  the  institutional  point  of  view,  they  have  drawn  dif-
erent  good  governance  codes  that  have  not  had  the  desired
ffect.  It  would  be  desirable  that  the  recommendations
ncluded  in  these  codes  became  laws  which  allow  improving
he  corporate  governance  of  companies.
While  the  link  between  corporate  governance  and  ﬁrm
erformance  has  been  widely  studied  in  the  ﬁnancial  lit-
rature  (Brown  and  Caylor,  2006),  the  analysis  of  the
ffect  of  corporate  governance  on  value  creation  in  adverse
conomic  contexts  is  much  more  limited  (Gupta  et  al.,
i
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013).  In  addition,  we  should  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  these
tudies  have  focused  on  ﬁnancial  entities  (Erkens  et  al.,
012),  while  our  paper  sheds  light  on  the  behaviour  of  non-
nancial  companies  with  regards  to  their  responsiveness,
hrough  corporate  governance,  to  value  creation  in  times
f  economic  crisis.  Speciﬁcally,  our  work  focuses  on  how
he  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  performance  dif-
ers  according  to  the  economic  context  for  the  company
performing  a  post-crisis  versus  a  pre-crisis  comparative
nalysis).
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section
resents  the  institutional  background,  to  provide  the  char-
cteristics  of  the  Spanish  context  and  describe  the  set
f  Spanish  codes  of  corporate  governance.  The  third  sec-
ion  reviews  the  literature,  to  determine  the  relationship
etween  the  different  variables  and  the  process  of  value
reation,  and  establishes  several  hypotheses.  The  fourth
ection  describes  the  methodology,  data  and  variables,
mpirical  analysis  and  results.  Finally,  we  draw  conclusions
nd  discuss  implications.
nstitutional background
n  top  of  the  recent  ﬁnancial  crises,  we  should  add  the
conomic  crisis  that  has  affected  many  countries  in  recent
ears,  rocking  countless  economies.  The  so-called  ‘‘Great
ecession’’  has  shocked  the  world  economy  as  a  whole,  but
n  an  asymmetrical  way.  Some  countries  are  facing  the  worst
conomic  scenario  in  decades.  Among  the  biggest  economies
n  the  OECD,  Spain  provides  the  most  interesting  case  for
 study  of  the  causes  and  consequences  of  this  recession,
ncluding  the  inﬂuence  of  corporate  governance  on  value
reation  in  different  economic  scenarios.  In  the  years  run-
ing  up  to  the  crisis,  Spain  was  characterized  by  strong
redit  growth,  which  was  derived  from  the  low  interest  rates
hat  prevailed  throughout  the  country  following  the  Mone-
ary  Union  and  that  led  to  a housing  bubble.  Real  estate
rices  grew  year  after  year  as  the  result  of  a sharp  increase
n  market  demand,  to  the  extent  that  by  2006  the  building
ector  represented  16%  of  the  country’s  GDP  in  real  terms
nd  up  to  20%  of  all  employment  generated  within  the  coun-
ry.  The  building  sector  caused  signiﬁcant  increases  in  GDP
ntil  2008,  when  the  ﬁrst  results  of  the  crisis  triggered  by
he  ﬁnancial  scandals  in  the  US  the  previous  year  appeared.
nemployment  rose  from  8%  to  25%,  and  real  GDP  growth
ates  have  been  signiﬁcantly  negative  since  2009.  The  cri-
is  also  led  to  an  increase  in  credit  risk,  and  in  Spain  the
ffect  was  observed  in  the  restrictions  imposed  by  ﬁnancial
ntities  on  new  loan  authorizations.  Despite  having  dimin-
shed  in  the  years  prior  to  the  crisis,  public  debt  once  again
rew  in  2008  because  of  economic  efforts  to  mitigate  thenternational benchmark and as the underlying index in the trad-
ng of derivatives. Technically it is a price index that is weighted
y capitalization and adjusted according to the free ﬂoat of each
ompany comprised in the index’’ (www.bde.es).
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In  this  context,  corporate  governance  has  gained  great
importance  in  recent  years  in  society,  with  an  increased
interest  in  all  types  of  companies  and  institutions  (Agudo
et  al.,  2008).  Spain  has  drawn  up  four  codes  of  good  gov-
ernance  in  the  last  decade  (the  Olivencia  Report,  1998; the
Aldama  Report,  2003;  the  Uniﬁed  Code,  2006,  updated  2013;
and  more  recently,  the  Good  Governance  Code,  2015).
The  ﬁrst  report  (hereafter  the  Olivencia  Report,  1998)
was  the  result  of  the  work  of  the  Special  Commission  for
the  study  of  an  ethical  code  for  boards,  which  was  chaired
by  Manuel  Olivencia  and  was  established  in  1998  with  a
dual  purpose:  on  the  one  hand,  to  draft  a  report  on  board
problems  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  develop  an  ethical
code  of  good  governance,  keeping  in  mind  the  need  for
reform  in  corporate  governance.  After  this  ﬁrst  report,  the
Special  Commission  to  foster  transparency  and  security  in
the  markets  and  in  listed  companies,  chaired  by  Enrique
Aldama,  published  a  report  in  2003  (hereafter,  the  Aldama
Report,  2003)  that  was  aimed  primarily  at  improving  trans-
parency  and  security  in  ﬁnancial  markets,  and  was  derived
from  the  implementation  analysis  of  the  Olivencia  Report.
It  should  be  noted  that  one  of  the  main  contributions  of  this
report  was  the  recommendation  to  consolidate  the  relevant
information  into  a  special  document  called  ‘‘Annual  report
on  corporate  governance’’,  which  would  be  a  standard
and  structured  instrument  to  give  information  on  corporate
governance.  The  structure  of  the  report  would  provide  a  uni-
form  presentation  basis  to  enable  investors  to  evaluate  and
monitor  this  area.
In  2006  the  Uniﬁed  Good  Governance  Code  was  published
(hereafter  the  Uniﬁed  Code,  2006),  which  was  the  result  of
work  done  by  the  Special  Working  Group  on  the  good  gov-
ernance  of  listed  companies,  led  by  Manuel  Conthe.  This
working  group  was  focused  on  harmonizing  and  updating
the  earlier  recommendations  in  the  Olivencia  and  Aldama
reports.  Since  the  Uniﬁed  Code  was  approved,  a  series  of
intervening  legal  texts  have  affected  some  of  its  recommen-
dations.  In  order  to  adapt  or  eliminate  the  recommendations
affected  by  the  new  legislation,  the  Comisión  Nacional  del
Mercado  de  Valores  (CNMV)  approved  a  partial  update  of  the
Uniﬁed  Code  in  June  2013.
In  recent  years,  since  the  beginning  of  the  international
ﬁnancial  crisis,  the  number  of  initiatives  related  to  good
practice  in  corporate  governance  matters  has  increased,
reﬂecting  the  widespread  conviction  that  it  is  important
that  listed  companies  are  managed  properly  and  transpar-
ently  in  order  to  generate  business  value,  improve  economic
efﬁciency  and  strengthen  investor  conﬁdence.
Spain  has  been  no  exception  to  this  overall  trend,  and
the  country  has  seen  solid  advances  in  good  corporate  gover-
nance.  An  Experts  Commission  was  established  in  2013  with
the  aim  of  proposing  initiatives  and  policy  reforms  to  ensure
good  corporate  governance.  The  result  of  the  Commission’s
work  was  the  approval  of  the  Good  Governance  Code  for
listed  companies  (hereafter  the  Good  Governance  Code,
2015)  in  February  2015.
Empirical  results  (Utrero-González  and  Callado-Mun˜oz,
2015)  show,  ﬁrst,  that  investors  react  to  governance
announcements,  and,  second,  that  whether  their  reaction
is  positive  or  negative,  and  how  signiﬁcant  it  is,  depends
crucially  on  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  code  recommen-
dations.
(
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In  conclusion,  the  evolution  of  the  recommendations  in
he  codes  has  led  to  a transformation  in  the  legislation,  since
he  desired  effect  of  improving  ﬁrms’  corporate  governance
as  not  achieved  through  voluntary  measures.
iterature review and development of
ypotheses
heoretical  background
he  literature  on  the  relationship  between  corporate  gov-
rnance  and  value  creation  has  expanded  in  recent  years
Demsetz  and  Villalonga,  2001;  Carter  et  al.,  2003;  Nicholson
nd  Kiel,  2007;  Lefort  and  Urzúa,  2008;  De  los  Ríos  et  al.,
009;  Campbell  and  Vera,  2010).  Most  of  this  research
s  based  on  the  three  theoretical  paradigms  analyzed  by
icholson  and  Kiel  (2007):  (i)  agency  theory,  under  which
he  board’s  role  as  supervisor,  and  the  control  it  exerts,  are
stablished;  (ii)  stewardship  theory,  according  to  which  the
oard  of  directors  takes  on  an  advisory  role  with  respect  to
he  management  team;  and,  lastly,  (iii)  resource  depend-
nce  theory,  according  to  which  the  board  acts  as  a  link
etween  the  organization  and  its  surroundings,  and  facil-
tates  the  capture  of  resources  (Pucheta-Martínez,  2015).
any  of  the  previous  studies  on  the  relationship  that  exists
etween  the  board  and  the  creation  of  value  in  the  company
ave  been  based  solely  on  agency  theory.  However,  includ-
ng  the  board’s  advisory  role  in  the  analysis  has  led  recent
esearchers  to  bear  the  stewardship  perspective  in  mind  and
ighlight  its  importance,  especially  in  turbulent  contexts
Pucheta-Martínez,  2015).  In  this  sense  we  have  adopted
 mixed  approach  in  this  paper  by  considering  stewardship
heory  (Barney,  1990;  Donaldson,  1990)  complemented  by
esource  dependence  theory  (Pfeffer  and  Salancik,  1978).
e  believe  that  stewardship  theory  captures  the  effect  of
oard  composition  on  value  creation  in  the  context  of  an
conomic  crisis.  Resource  dependence  theory  suggests  four
rimary  beneﬁts  of  external  linkages:  (1)  the  provision  of
esources  such  as  information  and  expertise;  (2)  the  cre-
tion  of  channels  of  communication  with  constituents  of
mportance  to  the  ﬁrm;  (3)  the  provision  of  commitments
f  support  from  important  organizations  or  groups  in  the
xternal  environment;  and  (4)  the  creation  of  legitimacy  for
he  ﬁrm  in  the  external  environment  (Carter  et  al.,  2010:
98).  Neither  the  different  theories  nor  the  existing  litera-
ure  question  the  fundamental  role  of  the  board  in  guiding
nd  carrying  out  the  necessary  controls.  The  corporate  scan-
als  in  the  early  years  of  the  last  decade  revealed  that
he  non-executive  board  members  in  those  ﬁrms  did  not
eport  any  signiﬁcant  oversights  by  managers.  The  recent
conomic  events  have  indicated  that  the  same  was  true  in
any  ﬁnancial  institutions.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that
he  literature  on  corporate  governance  and  performance
uring  the  crisis  focuses  mainly  on  ﬁnancial  companies.
According  to  Bekiaris  et  al.  (2013), one  of  the  major
auses  of  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  was  the  failure  of  corporate
overnance.  Two  basic  principles  of  corporate  governance
transparency  and  accountability)  were  violated  by  invest-
ent  and  commercial  banks  in  the  developed  world,  and  this
esulted  in  the  crisis.  In  an  attempt  to  mitigate  these  conse-
uences,  the  codes  of  Good  Governance  were  created  at  an
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nternational  level,  establishing  recommendations  to  guide
est  practice  but  without  making  rules  to  ensure  compliance
ith  them.  An  example  of  this  is  the  fact  that  in  most  of  the
odes  there  is  a  recommendation  regarding  the  presence  of
ndependent  members,  while  their  inﬂuence  may  have  on
he  board  is  not  explained  (Bekiaris  et  al.,  2013).  The  codes
o  not  say  what  powers  the  independent  members  should
e  allowed.
Several  empirical  studies  have  been  carried  out  to  exam-
ne  the  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  the
nancial  crisis.  These  include  that  of  Williams  et  al.  (2015),
hich  analyses  75  listed  companies  in  Australia  for  two
ears,  2005  and  2010,  considering  these  years  as  falling,
espectively,  before  and  after  the  global  ﬁnancial  crisis.
hese  authors  observe  that  after  the  global  ﬁnancial  crisis,
ompanies  restructured  their  boards,  increasing  the  number
f  independent  board  members.  Nevertheless,  they  high-
ight  the  need  to  explain  the  concept  of  ‘‘independence’’;
urthermore,  they  ask  themselves  whether  this  change  has
ome  about  in  order  to  improve  accountability  mechanisms
r  simply  to  give  the  appearance  of  good  corporate  gov-
rnance,  following  the  recommendations  of  the  Australian
ode  of  Good  Governance  (ASX,  2010).
Erkens  et  al.  (2012)  studied  the  impact  of  corporate  gov-
rnance  on  the  performance  of  ﬁnancial  companies  in  a
roup  of  30  countries  in  the  period  2007--2008.  In  spite  of
he  fact  that  all  the  companies  were  affected  by  the  interna-
ional  ﬁnancial  crisis,  the  ﬁnancial  companies  had  the  worst
esults,  because  of  their  greater  risk-taking  prior  to  the  cri-
is.  At  the  same  time,  in  terms  of  board  composition  Erkens
t  al.  (2012)  observed  that  there  was  a  greater  impact  on  the
erformance  of  those  companies  with  independent  board
embers  because  those  companies  ofﬂoaded  the  wealth  of
he  current  shareholders  to  the  debt  holders  by  increasing
heir  equity  capital  during  the  ﬁnancial  crisis.  These  authors
herefore  concluded  that  corporate  governance  had  a  con-
iderable  impact  on  company  performance  during  the  crisis,
hrough  ﬁnancing  policies  and  ﬁrms’  risk-taking.
On  the  other  hand,  Grove  et  al.  (2011)  concluded  that  the
erformance  of  banks  is  affected  by  the  structure  of  corpo-
ate  governance,  following  a  study  of  236  public  commercial
anks  in  the  United  States  during  the  years  2005--2008,  tak-
ng  the  period  between  2005  and  2007  as  the  pre-crisis
eriod  and  2008  as  being  during  the  crisis.  Thus,  CEO  duality
as  a  negative  relationship  with  ﬁnancial  performance  dur-
ng  the  pre-crisis  period,  and  no  impact  during  the  crisis.
ssen  et  al.  (2013)  analyze  1197  ﬁrms  across  26  Euro-
ean  countries  between  2004  and  mid-2009.  They  make  a
istinction  between  ﬁnancial  and  non-ﬁnancial  companies,
bserving  that  the  results  do  not  coincide.  Thus,  during  the
risis  board  size  and  CEO  duality  had  a  positive  impact  on
on-ﬁnancial  companies,  while  these  effects  were  absent
mong  ﬁnancial  companies.  On  the  other  hand,  they  observe
hat  board  independence  has  a  direct  relationship  with  com-
any  performance  in  times  of  crisis,  but  not  for  non-ﬁnancial
ompanies.
According  to  Berrone  (2009),  the  structure  of  corporate
overnance  is  a  key  factor  for  institutional  investors  when
eciding  in  which  company  to  invest.  In  addition,  75%  of
espondents  in  that  study  (29  institutional  investors  in  the
panish  market)  believe  that  the  current  governance  mech-
nisms  have  had  a  high  or  very  high  responsibility  in  the
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urrent  crisis,  especially  in  the  ﬁnancial  sector.  In  this  sense,
rom  the  perspective  of  institutional  investors,  changes  in
orporate  governance  are  also  required.  It  is  considered
hat  although  most  of  the  companies  listed  on  the  Span-
sh  stock  market  have  introduced  changes  in  recent  years
round  codes,  they  have  not  had  the  desired  effect,  espe-
ially  in  terms  of  separation  CEO-Chairman.  In  this  paper,
e  have  not  speciﬁcally  analyzed  the  corporate  governance
rom  the  perspective  of  institutional  investors,  given  that
heir  level  of  inﬂuence  on  the  structure  of  corporate  gover-
ance  is  very  small.
ypotheses
oard  size
 review  of  the  literature  on  board  size  yields  non-coincident
esults.  Some  authors  (Lefort  and  Urzúa,  2008)  do  not  ﬁnd
he  BOARD SIZE  variable  signiﬁcant;  others,  like  Hansson
t  al.  (2011),  ﬁnd  BOARD  SIZE  is  signiﬁcantly  negatively
ssociated  with  ﬁrm  performance.  Other  authors  (Yermack,
996)  show  an  inverse  relationship  between  ﬁrm  value  and
OARD  SIZE, explaining  their  results  with  agency  theory,
hich  suggests  that  smaller  is  better.  Besides,  Yermack
1996)  presents  evidence  that  small  boards  of  directors  are
ore  effective  and  that  ﬁrms  with  smaller  boards  achieve
igher  market  value.  According  to  Jensen  (1993),  ‘‘large
orporate  boards  may  be  less  efﬁcient  due  to  difﬁculties
n  solving  the  agency  problem  among  the  members  of  the
oard’’  Arosa  et  al.  (2013:  129);  they  consider  that  a  larger
roup  is  less  effective  because  the  coordination  and  process
roblems  outweigh  the  advantages  of  having  more  people
n  whom  to  draw.  In  line  with  these  results,  Dowell  et  al.
2011)  suggest  (and  conﬁrm  by  empirical  results)  that  small
oards  have  greater  capacity  for  making  decisions  quickly,
hich  is  needed  in  crisis  situations.
Conversely,  Nicholson  and  Kiel  (2007)  and  Jackling  and
ohl  (2009)  ﬁnd  a  positive  and  signiﬁcant  relationship.  These
uthors  base  their  results  on  resource  dependence  theory,
hich  argues  that  a greater  number  of  directors  provides
ore  information  for  appropriate  decision-making.  In  line
ith  the  latter  study,  we  expect  a  positive  association
etween  the  BOARD  SIZE  variable  and  Tobin’s  Q.  This  is  due
o  the  fact  that  board  size,  in  a  crisis  context,  seems,  in
act,  to  contradict  agency  theory,  since  many  studies  (such
s  those  by  Hambrick  and  D’Aveni  (1992)  and  Mueller  and
arker  (1997)) have  found  that  smaller  boards  are  worse,
n  the  sense  that  they  have  a  higher  probability  of  failure.
n  a  situation  of  ﬁnancial  stress  in  which  the  resource  sup-
ly  becomes  essential  to  a  company’s  survival,  large  boards
ffer  opportunities  for  resource  capture  and  networking
Dowell  et  al.,  2011).
The  empirical  results  of  Pucheta-Martínez  (2015)  opened
 new  route.  The  number  of  board  members  improves  per-
ormance,  but  only  up  to  a  certain  point,  after  which  value
ecreases  as  members  are  added  to  the  board.  Similar  evi-
ence  was  revealed  by  Hillman  et  al.  (2011)  and  O’Connell
nd  Cramer  (2010),  who  argued  that  a  balance  should  be
ought  between  the  advantages  (supervision  and  advice)
nd  the  disadvantages  (coordination  problems,  control,  and
ecision-making)  of  a large  board.
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In  short,  large  companies  that  are  already  established  in
the  market,  like  those  studied  here,  are  more  interested  in
the  beneﬁts  of  accessing  the  additional  resources  derived
from  their  large  board  size  than  in  the  additional  agency
costs  or  slower  decision-making  associated  with  a  certain
board  size  (Dowell  et  al.,  2011).  Beyond  a  certain  point,  the
difﬁcult  dynamics  of  a  large  board  prevail  over  the  skills  and
expertise  that  additional  directors  might  bring  (Azim,  2012).
This  leads  us  to  put  forward  a  ﬁrst  hypothesis:
H1.  Under  adverse  economic  conditions,  BOARD  SIZE  has  a
positive  effect  on  value  creation
Chief  executive  ofﬁcer  (CEO)  and  chairman  duality
In  the  Spanish  case,  the  Good  Governance  Code  (2015)
declares  that  CEO--chairman  duality  has  both  advantages
and  disadvantages.  The  main  advantages  lie  in  the  reduc-
tion  in  information  and  coordination  costs  as  well  as  clear
leadership.  On  the  other  hand,  the  main  disadvantage  is
the  concentration  of  power  in  a  sole  person.  Nevertheless,
although  it  puts  forward  these  arguments,  the  Code  does  not
lay  down  any  recommendations  about  separating  the  two
roles,  but  rather  maintains  the  same  lines  as  the  Codes  that
were  published  earlier  (Uniﬁed  Code,  2006,  updated  2013).
Agency  theory  (Berle  and  Means,  1932)  considers  that
CEO--chairman  duality  increases  CEO  power  but  negatively
affects  CEO  independence,  hindering  the  company’s  abil-
ity  to  establish  supervisory  mechanisms.  From  the  agency
theory  perspective,  duality  has  a  negative  effect  on  perfor-
mance.  The  agency  theory  argues  for  a  separation  of  the  two
positions,  and  states  that  the  CEO--chairman  cannot  perform
both  functions  without  there  being  a  conﬂict  of  interest.
Duality  generates  a  powerful  CEO  who  may  be  driven  by
self-interest,  dominating  the  board  management,  and  this
may  result  in  poor  performance  (Gabrielsson  et  al.,  2007;
Ghosh  et  al.,  2010;  Valenti  et  al.,  2011).
The  importance  of  the  monitoring  role  of  the  board  of
directors  lies  in  the  fact  that  when  directors  are  evaluating
manager  performance,  they  are  representing  the  sharehol-
ders  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983;  He  et  al.,  2009).  In  order  to
carry  out  this  role  properly,  the  board  must  be  independent,
both  through  the  board  structure  and  through  the  separation
of  the  roles  of  chairman  and  CEO.
From  the  perspective  of  stewardship  theory  (Davis  et  al.,
1997),  however,  the  relationship  is  the  opposite,  offering  a
more  humanistic  approach.  Greater  power  in  the  hands  of
the  CEO  may  lead  to  beneﬁts  that  are  greater  than  the  costs
in  times  of  crisis:  the  CEO’s  response  capacity  will  be  faster
when  faced  with  changes,  he  or  she  will  have  greater  incen-
tive  to  lead  the  company  out  of  the  crisis,  and  thanks  to  his
or  her  increased  power  he  or  she  will  be  able  to  take  extreme
but  necessary  decisions  (asset  restructuring,  mass  redundan-
cies,  and  so  on)  in  unstable  times,  such  as  the  ﬁnancial  crisis
that  began  in  2007  (Dowell  et  al.,  2011).  Stewardship  the-
ory  offers  support  to  the  idea  that  CEO  duality  contributes
to  timely  decision-making,  effective  execution  of  plans  and
efﬁcient  monitoring,  leading  the  ﬁrm  to  better  performance
(Huang  et  al.,  2012;  Arosa  et  al.,  2013;  García-Ramos  and
García-Olalla,  2014).
The  fact  that  these  studies  offer  mixed  results  coincides
with  the  description  given  by  Finkelstein  and  D’Aveni  (1994)
of  this  issue  as  a  ‘‘double-edged  sword’’.  The  authors  make
p
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he  point  that  the  resource  dependence  advantages  offered
y  the  possibility  of  the  CEO,  in  his  or  her  role  as  chair,  giv-
ng  the  outside  directors  relevant  information  regarding  ﬁrm
peration  and  ﬁnances,  can  appease  the  agency  problems
elated  to  CEO  duality  (Valenti  et  al.,  2011).
In  line  with  the  above,  other  studies  ﬁnd  a  posi-
ive  relationship  between  CEO  duality  and  performance  in
ow  muniﬁcence  and  high-complexity  environments  (Chen,
014;  Chang  et  al.,  2015).  Dowell  et  al.  (2011)  validated
his  hypothesis,  as  duality  allows  decisions  to  be  taken  more
uickly  as  a  result  of  the  CEO  having  more  power.
From  the  approach  of  the  institutional  investors,  it
s  considered  to  maintain  the  separation  between  CEO
nd  Chairman  encouraging  the  independence  of  the  board
Berrone,  2009).
Others  authors  put  forward  the  idea  that  the  degree  to
hich  the  ﬁrm’s  and/or  the  CEO’s  characteristics  are  suited
o  CEO  duality  may  be  decisive  in  the  way  duality  affects
he  ﬁrm’s  performance  (Kang  and  Zardkoohi,  2005;  Faleye,
007).
Duality  could  be  a  way  of  providing  ﬁrms  with  the
dvantages  that  derive  from  a  unity  of  command  at  top
anagement  levels,  such  as  a  clearer  strategic  orientation,
reater  autonomy  and  better  response  capacity  (Cabrera-
uárez  and  Martín-Santana,  2015).  Essen  et  al.  (2013)  put
orward  the  result  that  CEO  duality  is  positive  and  signif-
cant  for  the  performance  of  non-ﬁnancial  ﬁrms  during  a
risis.  That  is,  they  conﬁrmed  that  in  times  of  crisis,  those
oards  that  allow  greater  managerial  discretion  get  better
esults.  This  reasoning  leads  us  to  the  following  hypothesis:
2.  Under  adverse  economic  conditions,  CEO--CHAIRMAN
UALITY  has  a  positive  effect  on  value  creation
oard  independence
ll  the  written  codes  of  good  governance  throughout  the
orld  recommend  greater  independence  for  boards  (Zattoni
nd  Cuomo,  2008).  Independent  board  members  are  under-
tood  to  be  ‘‘those  that  are  able  to  carry  out  their  roles,
aving  been  appointed  in  accordance  to  their  personal  and
rofessional  conditions,  without  being  inﬂuenced  by  rela-
ionships  with  the  company,  its  signiﬁcant  shareholders  or
irectors’’  (Uniﬁed  Code,  2006:  52).
Regarding  the  number  of  independent  board  members,
he  Spanish  Good  Governance  Code  (2015)  recommends  that
hey  should  make  up  at  least  half  the  total  number  of  mem-
ers,  except  in  cases  in  which  the  company  does  not  have  a
igh  capitalization  rate  or  when  one  of  the  shareholders  or
everal  of  the  shareholders  jointly  in  concert  control  more
han  30%  of  the  capital,  in  which  case  a  third  of  the  total
umber  of  members  is  recommended.  This  code  differs  from
he  Uniﬁed  Code  published  in  2006  and  updated  in  2013,
here  the  only  recommendation  was  that  the  independent
embers  should  represent  at  least  a  third  of  the  total  board.
oard  participation  helps  strengthen  board  independence  in
hose  countries  in  which  minority  shareholders  have  little
rotection,  since  it  counters  the  power  of  majority  groups
Pindado  and  De  la  Torre,  2006).
The  implication  of  agency  theory,  in  terms  of  corpo-
ate  governance,  is  that  outside  directors  should  defend
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hareholders’  interests  through  appropriate  monitoring
echanisms  that  protect  the  shareholders  from  the  self-
nterest  of  the  management.  In  this  way,  having  a  large
umber  of  outside  directors  on  the  board  could  have  a
ositive  impact  on  performance  through  service  monitoring
Fama  and  Jensen,  1983;  Arosa  et  al.,  2013).
Agency  theory  is  not  the  only  theoretical  perspective  that
as  been  relied  on  to  explain  board  roles  and  board  compo-
ition.  The  service  role  can  be  related  to  the  resource  based
iew  and  resource  dependence  theory,  where  boards  are
onsidered  to  control  inter-organizational  dependencies  and
ct  as  a  strategic  resource  for  securing  critical  resources  for
he  ﬁrm  (Pfeffer  and  Salancik,  1978).  According  to  resource
ependence  theory,  outsiders  are  seen  as  a  linking  mecha-
ism  between  the  ﬁrm  and  its  environment  that  may  support
he  managers  in  the  achievement  of  the  various  goals  of  the
rganization  (Johnson  et  al.,  1996;  Arosa  et  al.,  2013).
One  of  the  positive  effects  of  bringing  outside  directors
nto  the  board  is  that  they  can  help  monitor  and  con-
rol  senior  managers,  making  sure  that  their  actions  take
nvestors’  interests  into  consideration  (Osma,  2008).
Among  the  reasons  why  outside  directors  are  considered
o  be  more  effective  than  inside  directors  when  monitor-
ng  managers  is  the  fact  that  they  often  have  experience  in
ecision-making  in  other  companies,  as  well  as  a  tendency
o  consider  their  reputation  in  the  managerial  work  market
Fama  and  Jensen,  1983;  Ghosh  et  al.,  2010).  Independent
irectors  are  also  expected  to  show  greater  objectivity  and
o  have  more  expertise  than  afﬁliated  directors.  For  these
easons,  there  is  a  belief  that  those  boards  with  more  out-
ide  directors  are  more  independent.
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  what  the  different  theories
uggest,  the  empirical  studies  carried  out  present  differ-
ng  results.  The  level  of  board  independence,  measured  in
erms  of  the  percentage  of  external  members,  can  create  or
estroy  value  in  a  company.  Mínguez  and  Martin  (2003)  cite
mpirical  studies  that  obtained  varying  results.  There  are
tudies  that  found  no  signiﬁcant  relationship  (Hermalin  and
eisbach,  1991;  Mínguez  and  Martin,  2003),  some  that  found
 positive  effect  (Barnhart  et  al.,  1994;  Yermack,  1996),
nd  others  that  found  a  signiﬁcant  but  negative  relationship
Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996).
Lefort  and  Urzúa  (2008)  found  that  an  increase  in  the  pro-
ortion  of  outside  directors  positively  affects  value  creation.
owever,  Carter  et  al.  (2010)  found  that  board  indepen-
ence  is  not  signiﬁcant.  Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (1988)
ndicate  that  there  is  a  tendency  in  times  of  crisis  to  reduce
he  power  of  the  CEO  and  to  increase  board  independence.
hang  et  al.  (2015)  also  observed  a  positive  and  signiﬁcant
elationship  between  board  composition  and  ﬁrm  perfor-
ance  for  the  period  of  the  deepest  crisis,  2008  to  2010.  On
he  other  hand,  Francis  et  al.  (2012)  found  that  board  inde-
endence  could  enhance  board  efﬁcacy  and  thereby  ﬁrm
erformance  during  a  crisis  period;  they  took  the  percent-
ge  of  outsiders  on  the  board  as  a  measure  of  independence
thus  looking  at  outside  directors,  whether  they  were  truly
ndependent  or  were  ﬁnancial  experts).
From  the  view  of  the  institutional  investors,  one  of
he  future  challenges  in  the  ﬁeld  of  Corporate  Gover-
ance  would  be  to  ensure  the  independence  of  directors.
his  would  allow  improving  the  ﬁrm  performance  (Berrone,
009).
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In  view  of  the  above,  we  believe  that  independent  direc-
ors  can  provide  more  resources  to  the  ﬁrm  and  improve
etworking,  positively  affecting  value  creation.  This  leads
s  to  the  following  hypothesis:
3.  Under  adverse  economic  conditions  BOARD
NDEPENDENCE  enhances  value  creation
oard  diligence
he  number  of  board  meetings  is  an  indicator  of  board
iligence.  Infrequent  board  meetings  may  indicate  limited
nterest  in  the  company,  or  even  a  lack  of  interest,  on
he  part  of  the  board.  In  the  same  way,  a  higher  num-
er  of  meetings  would  imply  a  greater  supervision  of  the
ompany’s  management,  with  a  positive  effect  on  its  per-
ormance  (Azim,  2012).  In  line  with  this,  the  Spanish  Good
overnance  Code  (2015)  recommends  that  a  board  meets
s  many  times  as  necessary  in  order  to  carry  out  its  duties
ffectively,  and  also  indicates  that  there  should  be  at  least
ight  meetings  a  year;  this  last  recommendation  differs  from
hose  of  previous  codes  (Uniﬁed  Code,  2006,  updated  2013).
From  the  perspective  of  agency  theory,  a  large  part  of
ach  board  meeting  is  taken  up  by  routine  tasks,  which
eaves  little  time  and  chance  for  independent  directors  to
xercise  meaningful  control  over  management  (Jackling  and
ohl,  2009).  It  could  be  beneﬁcial  for  boards  to  keep  activity
o  a  minimum,  as  a  high  level  of  board  activity  is  probably
ndicative  of  a response  to  poor  performance  (Jensen,  1993).
An  opposing  view  from  resource  dependence  theory  con-
iders  that  the  intensity  of  board  activity  (measured  by  the
requency  of  board  meetings)  is  an  aspect  that  is  linked
ith  corporate  governance  and  performance.  Some  authors
old  that  board  meetings  should  be  frequent  enough  to
llow  the  board  to  get  continuous  status  update  reports
n  the  company  (Gabrielsson  and  Winlund,  2000;  Arosa
t  al.,  2013).  The  importance  of  a board  may  be  inferred
rom  the  number  of  board  meetings  held,  on  the  assump-
ion  that  if  more  meetings  are  organized,  more  information
s  shared  and  more  issues  are  dealt  with.  Meetings  are
he  most  usual  occasion  on  which  ideas  are  discussed  and
xchanged  in  order  to  monitor  managers.  It  can  therefore
e  supposed  that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  meetings
ould  imply  greater  control  over  managers  and  therefore  an
ncrease  in  shareholder  wealth.  In  this  way,  there  is  a  pos-
tive  association  between  a  higher  number  of  meetings  and
igher  performance;  without  meetings,  the  board  has  fewer
pportunities  to  monitor  ﬁrm  performance  (Gabrielsson  and
inlund,  2000).  Following  this  line  of  argument,  several
uthors  have  found  a  positive  relationship  between  board
ctivity  and  ﬁrm  value.  They  believe  that  the  higher  the
umber  of  board  meetings  (especially  if  there  is  poor  per-
ormance,  a  crisis,  or  a  special  investment  programme  such
s  a  merger  or  acquisition),  the  greater  the  positive  impact
n  ﬁrm  value  (Brick  and  Chidambaran,  2010;  Ntim  and  Osei,
011).  Firms  with  a  worse  performance  (low  values  of  Tobin’s
)  could  increase  the  number  of  meetings  they  hold  in  order
o  improve  results.
Al-Najjar  (2012)  believes  that  boards  meet  more  fre-
uently  when  companies  have  large  boards  and  a  higher
roportion  of  independent  directors,  ﬁnding  no  signiﬁcant
elationship  between  the  variables  ‘‘duality’’  and  ‘‘board
iligence’’.
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With  this  caveat  in  mind,  we  test  the  following  hypothe-
sis:
H4.  Under  adverse  economic  conditions,  BOARD
DILIGENCE  has  a  positive  effect  on  value  creation.
Table  1  reports  results  on  those  explicative  variables  in
the  articles  reviewed.
Methodology, data and variables
Sample
The  point  of  departure  for  building  the  sample  was  to
consider  all  the  companies  listed  on  the  Spanish  Stock
Exchange  for  the  period  2004--2012  for  which  informa-
tion  was  available.2 Insurance  companies  and  banks  were
excluded  because  of  the  difﬁculty  in  calculating  Tobin’s
Q  (their  accounting  reports  are  speciﬁc  to  the  sector).  In
addition,  both  these  sectors  follow  their  own  regulatory
regimes  laid  down  by  the  General  Management  of  Insur-
ance  and  the  Bank  of  Spain,  respectively.  Firms  that  were
not  listed,  or  for  which  not  all  the  information  was  avail-
able  during  the  whole  of  the  research  period,  were  also
excluded.
Consequently,  the  initial  sample  consisted  of  68  compa-
nies  with  a  total  of  612  observations.  A  standard  analysis  of
potential  outliers  affecting  either  Tobin’s  Q  (hereafter  q)  or
ROA  (Return  on  Assets)  was  performed.  Using  the  boxplot
tool  and  the  standard  criteria,3 a  total  of  107  observations
was  excluded,  53  of  these  because  of  outliers  affecting  the
variable  q  and  54  for  outliers  in  the  case  of  ROA. Moreover,
the  ﬁrst  observation  is  lost  because  the  endogenous  vari-
able  is  included  in  the  speciﬁcation.  Hence,  the  ﬁnal  sample
includes  data  for  65  ﬁrms,  and  438  valid  observations  for  the
period  2005--2012.
Variables
Dependent  variable
In  order  to  approximate  ﬁrm  performance,  we  use  q.  This
ratio  has  been  widely  used  in  the  literature  (Lang  and  Stulz,
1994;  Demsetz  and  Villalonga,  2001;  Mínguez  and  Martin,
2003;  Lefort  and  Urzúa,  2008)  and  it  is  a  good  measure  to
evaluate  the  effect  of  board  composition  and  structure  on
value  creation  since  it  is  a  forward-looking  measure  that
integrates  investors’  expectations  (Demsetz  and  Villalonga,
2001;  Jiao,  2010).
We  deﬁne  q  as  the  sum  of  the  market  value  of  the  stock
and  the  book  value  of  the  debt  divided  by  the  book  value  of
the  total  assets  (following  Campbell  and  Vera  (2010),  Jiao
(2010)  and  Shan  and  McIver  (2011)).
2 Companies necessarily have to be listed because of the value
creation measures used in this work.
3 In particular, observations excluded were those outside the
interval (−0.43, 3.73) for Tobin’s Q and out of the range (−12.42,
18.62) for ROA. These intervals were computed using the formula:
lower limit = Q1 -- 1.5(Q3 − Q1) and upper limit = Q3 + 1.5(Q3 − Q1).
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It  seems  logical  in  our  case  to  adopt  this  position  of  the
nvestor  for  value  creation  analysis.  Shan  and  McIver  (2011:
10)  also  indicate  that  ‘‘markets  favour  speciﬁc  character-
stics  in  boards,  particularly  independence  and  professional
ualiﬁcations  as  a  means  to  improve  corporate  performance,
nd  that  this  will  be  reﬂected  in  the  level  of  companies’
obin’s  Q  measures’’.  Several  studies,  such  as  De  los  Ríos
t  al.  (2009),  rely  upon  Economic  Value  Added  (hereinafter
VA)  as  an  alternative  measure.  However,  a  number  of  rel-
vant  caveats  and  potential  problems  have  been  found,
elated  to  the  fact  that  this  measure  is  static  and  is  based
n  accounting  (Fernández,  2003).
ndependent  variables
n  order  to  analyze  the  effect  of  board  composition
n  performance,  four  independent  variables  are  included
n  the  econometric  speciﬁcation:  BOARD  SIZE, DUALITY,
OARD  INDEPENDENCE  and  BOARD  DILIGENCE.  The  ﬁrst  vari-
ble  is  measured  through  the  total  number  of  the  members
f  the  board.  DUALITY  is  a  dichotomous  variable;  either  the
ame  person  holds  the  position  of  CEO  and  is  the  chairman  of
he  board  (Duality  =  1),  or  the  two  positions  are  held  by  two
ifferent  people  (Duality  =  0).  BOARD  INDEPENDENCE  meas-
res  the  board’s  level  of  independence  as  the  percentage
f  independent  advisors  out  of  the  total  number  of  board
embers.  Finally,  BOARD  DILIGENCE  is  gauged  through  the
umber  of  board  meetings  held  per  year.4
ontrol  variables
e  also  included  two  control  variables:  SIZE  and  ROA. SIZE
s  a  control  variable  that  measures  the  size  of  the  com-
any  through  the  Napierian  logarithm  of  the  total  assets.
ccording  to  Mínguez  and  Martin  (2003), Yatim  et  al.  (2006)
nd  Jiao  (2010),  ROA  (Return  on  Assets)  measures  the  eco-
omic  proﬁtability  ratio.  In  preliminary  estimates,  the  ratio
f  total  debt  to  total  assets  was  also  included  but  multi-
ollinearity  was  troublesome.  The  effect  of  other  potential
ime-invariant  control  variables  (like  the  ﬁrm’s  sector  of
ctivity  or  the  fact  of  a company  having  a  family  character)
re  captured  by  individual  ﬁxed  effects.
The  results  obtained  by  Carter  et  al.  (2010)  for  the  SIZE
ariable  are  not  signiﬁcant.  However,  most  of  the  previous
tudies  (Campbell  and  Vera,  2010;  Mínguez-Vera  and  López-
artínez,  2010;  Vivel  et  al.,  2015)  obtained  a negative  and
igniﬁcant  correlation  with  q.  We  expect  the  same  relation-
hip  because,  like  these  authors,  we  consider  that  smaller
rms  have  a higher  ﬁrm  value.  Finally,  we  expect  the  ﬁrms
hat  have  a  greater  ROA  also  to  have  a  higher  ﬁrm  value,  as
hown  in  the  results  obtained  by  Campbell  and  Vera  (2010)
nd  Vivel  et  al.  (2015).
Table  2  includes  a  description  of  the  dependent,  inde-
endent  and  control  variables,  as  well  as  the  way  in  which
hey  are  calculated.
4 The results did not change when logarithms instead of abso-
ute values were used in the case of variables BOARD SIZE and
OARD DILIGENCE.  Linear correlations between the variables and
heir logs are very high (over 0.94).
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Table  1  The  effects  of  explanatory  variables  in  previous  studies.
Variables  Authors  Countries  Results  Years
BOARD  SIZE
Hambrick  and  D’Aveni  (1992)  United  States  Positive  1972--1982
Jensen  (1993)  United  States  Negative  1980--1990
Yermack  (1996)  United  States  Negative  1984--1991
Mueller  and  Barker  (1997)  United  States  Positive  1977--1993
Nicholson  and  Kiel  (2007)  Australia  Positive  2003
Lefort  and  Urzúa  (2008)  Chile  Not  signiﬁcant  2000--2003
Jackling  and  Johl  (2009)  India  Positive  2004--2006
O’Connell  and  Cramer  (2010)  Ireland  Positive/negative  2001
Hillman  et  al.  (2011) United  States Positive/negative 2006
Hansson  et  al.  (2011) Finland  Negative  2009
Dowell  et  al.  (2011) United  States Negative  2000--2002
Azim  (2012)  Australia  Positive/negative  2004--2006
Arosa  et  al.  (2013)  Spain  Negative  2006
Pucheta-Martínez  (2015)  Spain  Positive/negative  2004--2011
DUALITY
Finkelstein  and  D’Aveni  (1994) United  States  Positive  1984--1986
Davis  et  al.  (1997) Not  empirical Positive
Kang  and  Zardkoohi  (2005) Not  empirical Positive
Faleye  (2007) United  States Positive 1996--2002
Gabrielsson  et  al.  (2007) Norway  Negative  2005--2006
He  et  al.  (2009) Australia  Negative  2005
Ghosh  et  al.  (2010) United  States Negative  1998--2005
Dowell  et  al.  (2011) United  States Positive 2000--2002
Valenti  et  al.  (2011) United  States Negative  2000--2005
Huang  et  al.  (2012)  Taiwan  Positive  1988--2008
Arosa  et  al.  (2013)  Spain  Positive  2006
Essen  et  al.  (2013)  Europe  Positive  2004--2009
Chen  (2014)  Taiwan  Positive  2005--2011
García-Ramos  and  García-Olalla  (2014)  Spain  Positive  2001--2007
Cabrera-Suárez  and  Martín-Santana  (2015)  Spain  Positive  1989--2007
Chang  et  al.  (2015)  Taiwan  Positive  2008--2012
BOARD
INDEPENDENCE
Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (1991)  United  States  Positive  1971,1974,1977,
1980  and  1983
Agrawal  and  Knoeber  (1996) United  States  Negative  1987
Johnson  et  al.  (1996) Not  empirical Positive
Yermack  (1996) United  States Positive 1984--1991
Mínguez  and  Martin  (2003) Spain  No  signiﬁcant 1999
Pindado  and  De  la  Torre  (2006) Spain  Positive  1990--1999
Osma  (2008)  UK  Positive  1989--2002
Lefort  and  Urzúa  (2008)  Chile  Positive  2000--2003
Zattoni  and  Cuomo  (2008)  EU  Member  States  Positive  2005
Carter  et  al.  (2010)  United  States  Not  signiﬁcant  1998--2002
Ghosh  et  al.  (2010)  United  States  Positive  1998--2005
Dowell  et  al.  (2011)  United  States  Positive  2000--2002
Azim  (2012)  Australia  Positive  2004--2006
Francis  et  al.  (2012)  United  States  Positive  2007--2009
Arosa  et  al.  (2013)  Spain  Positive  2006
Chang  et  al.  (2015)  Taiwan  Positive  2008--2012
BOARD DILIGENCE
Jensen  (1993)  EEUU  Negative  1980--1990
Gabrielsson  and  Winlund  (2000) Sweden  Positive  1999
Jackling  and  Johl  (2009)  India  Negative  2004--2006
Brick  and  Chidambaran  (2010)  United  States  Positive  1999--2005
Ntim  and  Osei  (2011)  South  Africa  Positive  2002--2007
Al-Najjar  (2012)  United  States  Positive  2003--2008
Azim  (2012)  Australia  Positive  2004--2006
Arosa  et  al.  (2013)  Spain  Positive  2006
Source:  The authors.
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Table  2  Summary  of  descriptions  of  variables.
Name  of  variable  Type  Variable  description
q  Dependent  (Market  value  of  stock  +  book  value  of  debt)/Book  value  of  assets
BOARD SIZE  Independent  Total  number  of  board  members
DUALITY  Independent  Dichotomous  variable:  =  1  if  CEO  =  chair  and  =  0  if  not
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  Independent  Percentage  of  independent  directors  out  of  total  number  of  board  members
BOARD DILIGENCE  Independent  Number  of  board  meetings  held  per  year
SIZE Control  variable  Ln  (total  assets)
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Empirical  analysis
In  order  to  deﬁne  the  econometric  speciﬁcation  to  be  esti-
mated,  a  number  of  preliminary  estimates  and  tests  were
performed.  Wald  tests  on  both  redundant  time-ﬁxed  effects
and  redundant  individual-ﬁxed  effects  conﬁrmed  their  rele-
vance.  Second,  the  addition  of  the  lagged  endogenous  effect
as  a  right-hand  variable  is  required  in  order  to  deal  with
dynamics.5 Once  both  the  lagged  endogenous  and  time-
ﬁxed  effects  are  included,  the  Breusch--Godfrey  test  for
ﬁrst-order  autocorrelation  clearly  rules  out  this  problem.
However,  including  both  individual  effects  and  the  lagged
endogenous  effect  means  that  the  Panel  Least  Squares  (PLS)
estimates  become  biased  (Nickell,  1981).  Insofar  as  the  bias
is  of  order  1/T  and  T  is  8  in  our  case,  it  cannot  be  dismissed.
Hence  the  Arellano-Bond  2-step  difference  GMM  estima-
tor  is  computed,  using  one  lagged  value.  The  p-values  for
both  the  Arellano-Bond  second-order  serial  correlation  test
and  the  Sargan-Hansen  test  for  over-identifying  restrictions
are  reported  in  Table  5.  The  results  of  both  tests  support
the  validity  of  the  GMM  speciﬁcations.  Moreover,  the  GMM
estimator  is  a  better  option  for  dealing  with  the  poten-
tial  endogeneity  of  ROA  and  BOARD  DILIGENCE. Finally,  PLS
standard  errors  are  replaced  by  White  cross-section  errors
that  are  robust  to  both  contemporaneous  correlation  and
cross-section  heteroscedasticity.6 All  the  computations  were
performed  using  Eviews  9.  The  general  econometric  speciﬁ-
cation  is  as  follows:
qit =  ˇi +  ˛t +    · qi,t−1 +  ˇ1 ·  BOARD  SIZEit +  ˇ2 ·  DUALITYit
+  ˇ3 ·  BOARD  INDEPENDENCEit+ˇ4 ·  BOARD  DILIGENCEit
+  ˇ5 ·  SIZEit +  ˇ6 ·  ROAit +  εit (1)
The  main  descriptive  statistics  for  all  the  variables  are
reported  in  Table  3.  Variance  Inﬂation  Factors  (VIF)  were
also  computed.  Insofar  as  their  values  were  very  low  (below
1.3  in  all  cases),  multicollinearity  problems  were  discarded
(O’Brien,  2007).  In  Table  4  the  values  for  the  average  and
standard  deviations  of  all  variables  in  both  periods  are  pro-
vided.  The  most  relevant  differences  are  in  q  and  ROA. As
5 According to the panel unit root ADF test (assuming common
slopes) on ROA and q, both variables would be I(0).
6 The basic results for statistical signiﬁcance held when standard
errors were used.
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xpected,  in  both  cases,  they  tend  to  be  higher  in  the  period
005--2008.
esults
he  econometric  results  are  synthesized  in  Table  5. In
olumns  1  and  2  the  sample  includes  all  available  obser-
ations.  Column  1  reports  the  results  for  the  PLS  estimation
nd  column  2  those  for  the  GMM  estimation.  The  drop  in
he  number  of  observations  is  due  to  the  use  of  differences
n  the  second  case.  In  columns  3--5,  the  sample  is  reduced
o  results  for  2009--2012  in  order  to  focus  on  the  reces-
ion  years,  giving  us  the  chance  to  check  the  determinants
f  ﬁrm  performance  under  extremely  negative  conditions.
oodness  of  ﬁt  is  high,  with  R2 around  0.8.
In  columns  1  and  2,  the  control  variables  are  highly
igniﬁcant.  Smaller  ﬁrms  and  those  with  higher  ROA  show
igher  q  values.  On  the  contrary,  BOARD  SIZE  is  not  sig-
iﬁcant,  and  BOARD  INDEPENDENCE  is  signiﬁcant  only  at  a
0%  level  and  in  the  case  of  the  PLS  estimate.  In  contrast,
OARD  DILIGENCE  is  signiﬁcant  at  a  5%  level  and  the  coefﬁ-
ient  on  DUALITY  is  positive  and  highly  signiﬁcant  in  column
.  The  sign  on  BOARD  DILIGENCE  is  contrary  to  what  was
xpected:  the  higher  the  number  of  meetings,  the  lower
he  q,  which  would  conﬁrm  the  existence  of  the  inverse
elationship  suggested  above,  and  lead  us  to  reject  the
ourth  hypothesis.  Concerning  the  variable  DUALITY,  column
 reﬂects  a  positive  coefﬁcient  for  the  total  sampling  period
ncluding  pre-crisis  and  crisis  periods.  However,  in  the  period
f  deepest  crisis  (2009--2012)  the  positive  effect  of  this  dual-
ty  also  fades  (column  5);  these  results  do  not  support  the
ypothesis  2.
First,  the  lagged  endogenous,  ROA  and  DUALITY  become
on-signiﬁcant  variables  at  the  usual  levels.  The  economic
nterpretation  of  these  results  is  that  value  creation  is  more
olatile,  the  relationship  between  ROA  and  q  is  distorted
n  recession  years,  and  DUALITY  is  not  relevant  in  stress-
ul  times  for  ﬁrms.  From  an  econometric  standpoint,  this
eans  that  the  GMM  estimator  in  column  5  is  not  required,7
nd  the  PLS  estimate  is  not  subject  to  biases  because  of  the
nclusion  of  the  lagged  endogenous  effect  as  a right-hand
ariable  or  the  simultaneity  of  some  regressors.  Second,
oth  BOARD  INDEPENDENCE  and  BOARD  SIZE  become  sta-
istically  signiﬁcant  at  the  5%  level.  Column  4  replicates
7 All in all, the results in columns 3 (PLS) and 5 (GMM) are very
imilar.
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Table  3  Descriptive  statistics.
Variable  Mean  Standard  deviation  Minimum  Maximum
q  1.54  0.65  0.45  3.68
q−1 1.61  0.65  0.47  3.67
BOARD SIZE  11.47  3.42  5  21
DUALITY 0.59  0.49  0  1
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  0.33  0.18  0.00  0.88
BOARD DILIGENCE  10.05  3.39  1  27
SIZE 18.45  2.14  13.59  23.15
ROA 3.02  5.60  −12.34  18.35
Notes: Statistics computed on the common unbalanced sample (438 observations).
Table  4  Descriptive  statistics  (subsamples).
Variable  Mean  (2005--08)  Standard  deviation  (2005--08)  Mean  (2009--12)  Standard  deviation  (2009--12)
q  1.80 0.66  1.31  0.54
q−1 1.88 0.65 1.36  0.53
BOARD SIZE 11.55 3.53 11.41 3.33
DUALITY  0.61 0.49 0.57  0.50
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 0.33 0.18 0.33 0.17
BOARD DILIGENCE 9.94 3.51 10.15 3.28
SIZE  18.34 2.13 18.57 2.16
ROA 3.81  4.95  2.26  6.08
Sample size  214  214  224  224
Notes: Statistics computed on the common unbalanced sample
Table  5  Econometric  estimates  of  Eq.  (1).
1  2  3  4  5
Period  2005--2012  2006--2012  2009--2012  2009--2012  2009--2012
q−1 0.38
(4.12)***
0.41
(10.67)***
0.28
(1.61)
−0.01
(0.29)
BOARD SIZE 0.012
(0.63)
−0.015
(0.77)
0.06
(2.10)**
0.06
(2.25)**
0.03
(2.29)**
DUALITY  0.004
(0.06)
0.24
(3.22)***
0.015
(0.53)
0.036
(0.74)
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  0.12
(1.63)*
0.03
(0.20)
0.47
(2.54)**
0.67
(3.14)***
0.66
(2.54)**
BOARD  DILIGENCE  −0.019
(2.14)**
−0.054
(2.95)***
−0.009
(0.92)
0.025
(1.21)
SIZE −0.31
(6.15)***
−0.42
(6.00)***
−0.36
(3.98)***
−0.45
(4.54)***
−0.30
(2.54)***
ROA  0.018
(3.52)***
0.014
(2.53)**
−0.003
(0.92)
0.002
(0.27)
R2 0.782  0.855  0.842
Sargan test  (p-value)  0.60  0.85
AB autocorrelation  test  (p-value)  0.44  0.07
Estimator Panel  least
squares
GMM  Panel  least
squares
Panel  least
squares
GMM
Number of  observations  438
(65  ﬁrms)
373
(64  ﬁrms)
224
(63  ﬁrms)
224
(63  ﬁrms)
207
(60  ﬁrms)
Notes: Estimates include both individual-ﬁxed and time-ﬁxed effects. Corresponding t-statistics or z-statistics are in parentheses.
In columns [1], [3] and [4] t-statistics are computed using White cross-section errors.
Instruments in columns 2 and 5 include ﬁrst-differences of the lagged endogenous, time-dummies and ﬁrst-differences of exogenous
variables, excluding ROA and BOARD DILIGENCE. The reduction in the sample size is due to the use of ﬁrst-differences.
* indicates signiﬁcant at 10%.
** indicates signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** indicates signiﬁcant at 1%.
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column  3  excluding  the  non-signiﬁcant  variables  at  the  10%
level  or  less  in  column  3.  The  Breusch--Godfrey  test  of  auto-
correlation  rejected  autocorrelation  at  10%  signiﬁcance  or
less  in  both  columns  3  and  4.  The  estimated  coefﬁcients  in
column  4  of  Table  5  and  the  ranks  of  both  variables  in  Table  3
can  be  combined  to  get  an  idea  of  the  impact  of  both  varia-
bles  on  q.  Ceteris  paribus,  the  positive  contemporaneous
effect  of  BOARD  INDEPENDENCE  on  q  would  range  from  0  to
+0.59,  and  the  effect  of  BOARD  SIZE  from  +0.30  to  +1.26.
Finally,  BOARD  DILIGENCE  becomes  non-signiﬁcant  (column
5).  These  results  do  not  support  Hypothesis  4  in  the  worst
economic  situation.  However,  for  the  total  sample  period  the
coefﬁcient  is  negative  and  signiﬁcant,  reﬂecting  a  negative
effect  of  a  higher  number  of  meetings  on  value  creation.  A
possible  explanation  is  that,  in  times  of  crisis,  the  number
of  meetings  adjusts  to  the  real  needs  of  business,  having
neither  positive  nor  negative  effect  on  value  creation.
Conclusions
Based  on  the  analysis  carried  out  in  this  paper,  the  empir-
ical  evidence  supports  the  idea  that  the  structure  and
composition  of  the  board  has  an  effect  on  company  perfor-
mance  under  adverse  economic  conditions.  Moreover,  this
effect  varies  from  that  arising  in  stable  situations.  In  times
of  stress,  most  of  the  companies  in  the  study  increased
the  number  of  members  on  their  boards,  an  increase  that
is  linked  to  greater  independence.  This  had  a  positive
effect  on  the  companies’  value  creation.  A  similar  result
is  obtained  when  the  analysis  of  independence  is  carried
out  through  measuring  the  number  of  directors  represent-
ing  large  shareholder  ownership,  rather  than  through  the
number  of  independent  board  members.  Bigger  boards  have
higher  possibilities  of  creating  ‘‘links’’  with  their  environ-
ment  than  smaller  boards  (Castro  et  al.,  2010).  From  our
point  of  view,  when  economic  environmental  conditions  are
highly  turbulent,  as  happened  during  the  period  of  the  study,
the  possibility  of  creating  more  ‘‘links’’  or  relations  with  a
company’s  environment  aids  the  business  in  attaining  good
results.
The  same  person  holding  the  positions  of  both  CEO  and
chairman  does  not  seem  to  affect  the  value  generation
process  when  attention  is  focused  on  the  most  stressful  sce-
narios.  It  seems  that  the  potentially  negative  effects  of  this
duality  are  compensated  for  by  the  CEO  being  endowed  with
greater  power,  thus  allowing  him  or  her  to  take  drastic  deci-
sions  to  deal  with  the  crisis  situation.  A  similar  situation
arises  with  regards  to  the  diligence  of  the  board;  if  the  num-
ber  of  meetings  per  year  is  adequate  (there  are  neither  too
many,  which  would  hinder  management,  nor  too  few,  which
would  mean  that  the  board  hardly  exerted  any  inﬂuence  on
the  functioning  of  the  company),  this  has  neither  a  positive
nor  a  negative  effect  on  value  generation  for  the  companies
studied  here.
Furthermore,  our  results  lead  us  to  believe  that  current
governance  structures  are  not  as  efﬁcient  as  they  could
be.  It  seems  that  restructuring  companies  would  lead  to
greater  generation  of  value.  In  recent  years,  many  countries
have  drawn  up  codes  of  good  governance  for  listed  com-
panies  in  an  attempt  to  improve  the  way  their  governing
bodies  function  (Zattoni  and  Cuomo,  2008),  with  most  of
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hem  proposing  that  the  number  of  independent  directors
e  increased.  Restructuring  boards  to  achieve  greater  pro-
essionalism  and  independence  would  lead  to  greater  value
reation.  We  also  believe  that  many  ﬁnancial  scandals  could
ave  been  avoided  if  the  boards  had  included  a  greater  num-
er  of  independent  members.
In  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  ﬂood  of  initiatives
oncerning  good  practice  in  corporate  governance  mat-
ers.  Moreover,  these  initiatives  have  multiplied  since  the
tart  of  the  global  ﬁnancial  crisis,  reﬂecting  the  widespread
onviction  that  if  listed  companies  are  run  in  a  proper  and
ransparent  manner  this  is  a  key  driver  of  value  generation
n  the  corporate  sector,  improved  economic  efﬁciency  and
he  strengthening  of  investor  trust  (Good  Governance  Code,
015).  Therefore,  according  to  Lei  and  Song  (2012),  com-
anies  that  want  to  increase  their  value  through  corporate
overnance  should  reorganize  their  boards  by  giving  them
ore  independence.  In  line  with  this,  empirical  work  con-
ludes  that,  in  difﬁcult  times,  the  level  of  independence  has
ad  a  positive  effect  on  the  creation  of  value.
According  to  Perry  and  Shivdasani  (2005),  the  conclusions
f  this  study  are  relevant  for  business  management.  The
bserved  results  indicate  that  companies  that  are  restruc-
uring  their  boards  should  be  recommended  to  move  towards
reater  independence.  This  change  in  board  composition
ould  have  a  positive  effect  on  value  creation,  since  greater
ndependence  would  enable  the  ratiﬁcation  of  more  difﬁ-
ult  decisions  such  as  asset  restructuring  or  redundancies,
hich  would  improve  performance.  Well-connected  inde-
endent  directors  have  a  greater  capacity  for  networking
nd  fundraising,  which  leads  to  increased  value  creation  for
he  company  (Ghosh  et  al.,  2010;  Arosa  et  al.,  2013).
The  results  obtained  lead  us  to  think  that  the  current
overnance  structures  of  listed  companies  are  not  the  most
fﬁcient,  and  therefore  that  restructuring  these  companies
ill  allow  for  the  generation  of  more  value.  There  have
een  several  attempts  to  improve  the  governing  bodies  of
panish  listed  companies,  with  the  publication  of  several
eports  and  codes  of  good  governance  (Olivencia  Report,
998;  Aldama  Report,  2003;  Uniﬁed  Code,  2006,  updated
013;  Good  Governance  Code,  2015).  All  of  them  recom-
end  greater  board  independence.
In  the  light  of  the  above,  public  institutions  should  be
ware  that,  in  order  to  achieve  the  desired  effect  through
he  drafting  of  good  governance  codes,  the  recommenda-
ions  would  have  to  become  enforceable  legal  regulations.
We  are  aware  that  this  article  has  some  limitations.  The
rst  is  that  the  work  is  focused  on  the  analysis  of  listed  com-
anies  in  Spain  alone.  Future  research  should  extend  this
tudy  to  other  countries  for  the  purpose  of  comparison.  A
omparative  analysis  between  two  blocks  could  also  be  con-
idered:  one  made  up  of  the  nations  most  affected  by  the
risis  (Greece,  Portugal,  Italy,  and  Spain),  and  the  other  of
ountries  such  as  France,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom.
n  addition,  the  article  only  analyzes  the  composition  and
tructure  of  the  board.  Future  studies  should  examine  the
ffect  of  ownership  concentration  on  performance.
This  paper  analyses  the  effect  of  corporate  governance
n  value  creation  for  listed  companies  for  the  period
006--2012.  The  empirical  work  shows  that  the  greater  the
umber  of  independent  directors,  the  greater  the  value  cre-
ted.  Additionally,  it  seems  that  not  only  is  it  important
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o  increase  the  number  of  independent  directors,  but  also
hat  it  is  vital  that  this  number  should  reach  a  minimum
ercentage  to  inﬂuence  the  board.
cknowledgements
he  authors  gratefully  acknowledge  the  helpful  comments
nd  suggestions  received  from  the  referees  and  the  Asso-
iate  Editor,  Alejandro  Escribá.  Besides,  we  would  like  to
hank  the  ﬁnancial  support  by  the  Family  Business  Chair
University  of  Vigo)and  research  assistance  by  Alejandro
omínguez.
eferences
grawal, A., Knoeber, C.R., 1996. Firm performance and mech-
anisms to control agency problems between managers and
shareholders. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 31, 377--397.
gudo, L.F., Sanjuán, I.M., Fraile, I.A., 2008. Evolución temporal de
los Códigos de Buen Gobierno en Espan˜a. Boletín Económico de
ICE 2948., pp. 19--28.
guilera, R.V., Cuervo-Cazurra, A., 2009. Codes of good governance.
Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 17 (3), 376--387.
ldama Report, 2003. Report of the Special Commission to foster
transparency and security in the markets and listed companies,
Available from: http://www.cnmv.es.
l-Najjar, B., 2012. The determinants of board meetings: evidence
from categorical analysis. J. Appl. Acc. Res. 13 (2), 178--190.
rosa, B., Iturralde, T., Maseda, A., 2013. The board structure and
ﬁrm performance in SMEs: evidence from Spain. Investig. Eur.
Dir. Econ. Empresa 19, 127--135.
SX (Australian Stock Exchange), 2010. Corporate Gov. Council,
Available from: http://www.asx.com.au.
zim, M.I., 2012. Corporate governance mechanisms and their
impact on company performance: a structural equation model
analysis. Aust. J. Manage. 37, 481--505.
arney, J.B., 1990. The debate between traditional management
theory and organizational economics: substantive differences or
intergroup conﬂict? Acad. Manage. Rev. 15 (3), 382--393.
arnhart, S.W., Marr, M.W., Rosenstein, S., 1994. Firm performance
and board composition: some new evidence. Manag. Decis. Econ.
15, 329--340.
astro, C.B., Perin˜an, M.M.V., Pérez-Calero, L., 2010. ¿Son efectivos
los Consejos de Administración? La eﬁcacia del Consejo y los
resultados de la empresa. Investig. Eur. Dir. Econ. Empresa 16
(3), 107--126.
ekiaris, M., Efthymiou, T., Koutoupis, A.G., 2013. Economic crisis
impact on corporate governance & internal audit: the case of
Greece. Corp. Ownersh. Control 11 (1), 55--64.
erle, A.A., Means, G., 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private
Property. Commerce Clearing House, New York.
errone, P., 2009. Estudio sobre la estructura de los Consejos de
Administración. Una visión contrastada entre Inversores Institu-
cionales y Presidentes. Working Paper IESE Business School.
ME, 2007--2014. Fact Book, Available from:
http://www.bolsasymercados.es.
rick, I.E., Chidambaran, N.K., 2010. Board meetings, committee
structure, and ﬁrm value. J. Corp. Finance 16, 533--553.
rown, L.D., Caylor, M.L., 2006. Corporate governance and ﬁrm
performance. J. Acc. Public Policy 25, 409--434.abrera-Suárez, M.K., Martín-Santana, J.D., 2015. Board compo-
sition and performance in Spanish non-listed family ﬁrms: the
inﬂuence of type of directors and CEO duality. Bus. Res. Q. 18,
213--229.
GM.  Villanueva-Villar  et  al.
ampbell, K., Vera, A.M., 2010. Female board appointments and
ﬁrm valuation: short and long-term effects. J. Manag. Gov. 14,
35--59.
arter, D.A., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B.J., Simpson, W.G., 2010. The
gender and ethnic diversity of US boards and board commit-
tees and ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 18 (5),
396--414.
arter, D.A., Simkins, B.J., Simpson, W.G., 2003. Corporate gover-
nance, board diversity and ﬁrm value. Financ. Rev. 38, 33--53.
hang, C.S., Yu, S.W., Hung, C.H., 2015. Firm risk and performance:
The role of corporate governance. Rev. Manag. Sci 9, 141--173.
hen, I.J., 2014. Financial crisis and the dynamics of corporate gov-
ernance: evidence from Taiwan’s listed ﬁrms. Int. Rev. Econ.
Finance 32, 3--28.
avis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D., Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a stew-
ardship theory of management. Acad. Manag. Rev. 22 (1), 20--47.
e los Ríos, A., Jiménez, M.T., Valencia, P.T., Peralbo, A.C., 2009.
Generation of value in the IBEX-35 ﬁrms: TSCS approach. Span.
J. Finance Acc. 38 (142), 239--263.
emsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership structure and corpo-
rate performance. J. Corp. Finance 7 (3), 209--233.
onaldson, L., 1990. The ethereal hand: organizational economics
and management theory. Acad. Manag. Rev. 15 (3), 369--381.
owell, G.W.S., Shackell, M.B., Stuart, N.V., 2011. Boards, CEOs,
and surviving a ﬁnancial crisis: evidence from the internet shake-
out. Strateg. Manag. J. 32, 1025--1045.
rkens, D.H., Hung, M., Matos, P., 2012. Corporate governance in
the 2007--2008 ﬁnancial crisis: evidence from ﬁnancial institu-
tions worldwide. J. Corp. Finance 18 (1), 389--411.
ssen, M., Engelen, P.J., Carney, M., 2013. Does good corporate
governance help in a crisis? The impact of country- and ﬁrm-
level governance mechanisms in the European ﬁnancial crisis.
Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 21 (3), 201--224.
aleye, O., 2007. Does one hat ﬁt all? The case of corporate lead-
ership structure. J. Manage. Gov. 11 (3), 239--259.
ama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and con-
trol. J. Law Econ. 26, 301--325.
ernández, P., 2003. EVA, economic proﬁt and cash value added do
not measure shareholder value creation. ICFAI. J. Appl. Finance
9 (3), 74--94.
inkelstein, S., D’Aveni, R.A., 1994. CEO duality as a double-edged
sword: how boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance
and unity of command. Acad. Manag. J. 37, 1079--1108.
rancis, B.B., Hasan, I., Wu,  Q., 2012. Do corporate boards mat-
ter during the current ﬁnancial crisis? Rev. Financ. Econ. 21,
39--52.
abrielsson, J., Huse, M., Minichilli, A., 2007. Understanding the
leadership role of the board chairperson through a team pro-
duction approach. Int. J. Leadersh. Stud. 3 (1), 21--39.
abrielsson, J., Winlund, H., 2000. Boards of directors in small
and medium-sized industrial ﬁrms: examining the effects of the
board’s working style on board task performance. Entrep. Reg.
Dev. 12, 311--330.
arcía-Ramos, R., García-Olalla, M., 2014. Board independence and
ﬁrm performance in Southern Europe: a contextual and contin-
gency approach. J. Manag. Organ. 20 (3), 313--332.
hosh, A., Marra, A., Moon, D., 2010. Corporate boards, audit com-
mittees, and earnings management: pre- and post-SOX evidence.
J. Bus. Finance Acc. 37 (9 & 10), 1145--1176.
ood Governance Code, 2015. Good Governance Code of Listed
Companies, Available from: http://www.cnmv.es.
rove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L.M., Xu, P., 2011. Corporate
governance and performance in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis:
evidence from US commercial banks. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 19 (5),
418--436.upta, K., Krishnamurti, C., Tourani-Rad, A., 2013. Is corporate
governance relevant during the ﬁnancial crisis? J. Int. Financ.
Mark. Inst. Money 23, 85--110.
e  cre
O
O
O
O
P
P
P
P
R
S
S
U
U
V
V
W
Y
YOn  the  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  valu
Hambrick, D.C., D’Aveni, R.A., 1992. Top team deterioration as part
of the downward spiral of large corporate bankruptcies. Manag.
Sci. 38, 1445--1466.
Hansson, M., Liljeblom, E., Martikainen, M., 2011. Corporate gov-
ernance and proﬁtability in family SMEs. Eur. J. Finance 17,
391--408.
He, L., Wright, S., Evans, E., Crowe, S., 2009. What makes a board
independent? Australian evidence. Acc. Res. J. 22 (2), 144--166.
Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1988. The determinants of board
composition. RAND J. Econ. 19 (4), 589--606.
Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1991. The effect of board compo-
sition and direct incentives on corporate performance. Financ.
Manag. 20, 101--112.
Hillman, A.J., Shropshire, C., Certo, S.T., Dalton, D.R., Dalton,
C.M., 2011. What I like about you? A multilevel study of share-
holder discontent with director monitoring. Organ. Sci. 22 (3),
675--687.
Huang, Y.C., Hou, N.W., Cheng, Y.J., 2012. Illegal insider trading
and corporate governance: evidence from Taiwan. Emerg. Mark.
Finance Trade 48 (3), 6--22.
Jackling, B., Johl, S., 2009. Board structure and ﬁrm performance:
evidence from India’s top companies. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 17,
492--509.
Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the
failure of internal control systems. J. Finance 48, 831--880.
Jiao, Y., 2010. Stakeholder welfare and ﬁrm value. J. Bank. Finance
34, 2549--2561.
Johnson, J.L., Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E., 1996. Boards of directors:
a review and research agenda. J. Manag. 22, 409--438.
Kang, E., Zardkoohi, A., 2005. Board leadership structure and ﬁrm
performance. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 13 (6), 785--799.
Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1994. Tobin’s q, corporate diversiﬁcation,
and ﬁrm performance. J. Polit. Econ. 102 (6), 1248--1280.
Lefort, F., Urzúa, F., 2008. Board independence, ﬁrm performance
and ownership concentration: evidence from Chile. J. Bus. Res.
61 (6), 615--622.
Lei, A.C.H., Song, F.M., 2012. Board structure, corporate gover-
nance and ﬁrm value: evidence from Hong Kong. Appl. Financ.
Econ. 22, 1289--1303.
Mínguez, A., Martin, J.F., 2003. The Board of Directors as a Control
Mechanism: Evidence for the Spanish Market. Valencian Institute
of Economic Research, Available from: www.ivie.es.
Mínguez-Vera, A., López-Martínez, R., 2010. Female directors and
SMES: an empirical analysis. J. Global Strateg. Manag. 8, 30--46.
Mueller, G.C., Barker, V.L., 1997. Upper echelons and board char-
acteristics of turnaround and nonturnaround declining ﬁrms. J.
Bus. Res. 39, 119--134.
Nicholson, G.J., Kiel, G.C., 2007. Can directors impact per-
formance? A case-based test of three theories of corporate
governance. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 15 (4), 585--608.
Nickell, S., 1981. Biases in dynamic models with ﬁxed effects.
Econometrica 49 (6), 1417--1426.
Ntim, C.G., Osei, K.A., 2011. The impact of corporate board meet-
ings on corporate performance in South Africa. Afr. Rev. Econ.
Finance 2 (2), 83--103.
Zation  245
’Brien, R.M., 2007. A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance
inﬂator factors. Qual. Quant. 41 (5), 673--690.
’Connell, V., Cramer, N., 2010. The relationship between ﬁrm per-
formance and board characteristics in Ireland. Eur. Manag. J. 28
(5), 387--399.
livencia Report, 1998. Report of the Special Commission on an eth-
ical code for the members of the board of companies, Available
from: http://www.cnmv.es.
sma, B.G., 2008. Board independence and real earnings manage-
ment: the case of R&D expenditure. Corp. Gov. 16 (2), 116--131.
erry, T., Shivdasani, A., 2005. Do boards affect performance? Evi-
dence from corporate restructuring. J. Bus. 78 (4), 1403--1431.
feffer, J., Salancik, G.R., 1978. The External Control of Organiza-
tions: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper & Row, New
York.
indado, J., De la Torre, C., 2006. The role of investment, ﬁnancing
and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership struc-
ture: empirical evidence from Spain. Eur. Financ. Manag. 12 (5),
661--687.
ucheta-Martínez, M.C., 2015. El papel del Consejo de Admin-
istración en la creación de valor en la empresa. Revista de
Contabilidad/Span. Acc. Rev. 18 (2), 148--161.
ossi, M., Nerino, M., Capasso, A., 2015. Corporate governance and
ﬁnancial performance of Italian listed ﬁrms. the results of an
empirical research. Corp. Ownersh. Control 12 (2), 628--643.
han, Y.G., McIver, R.P., 2011. Corporate governance mechanisms
and ﬁnancial performance in China: panel data evidence on
listed non-ﬁnancial companies. Asia Paciﬁc Bus. Rev. 17 (3),
301--324.
ilva, E.S., Santos, J.F., Almeida, M.A., 2011. Conselho de
Administrac¸ao: uma análise da inﬂuencia dos níveis de endivi-
damento. RBGN, Revista Brasileira de Gestao dos Negócios 13
(41), 440--453.
niﬁed Good Governance Code, 2006. Uniﬁed Good Governance
Code of Listed Companies, Available from: http://www.cnmv.es.
trero-González, N., Callado-Mun˜oz, F.J., 2015. Do investors react
to corporate governance news? An empirical analysis for the
Spanish market. Bus. Res. Q. 19, 13--25.
alenti, M.A., Luce, R., Mayﬁeld, C., 2011. The effects of ﬁrm
performance on corporate governance. Manag. Res. Rev. 34,
266--283.
ivel, M., Otero, L., Fernández, S., Durán, P., 2015. Is value creation
consistent with currency hedging? Eur. J. Finance 21 (10--11),
912--945.
illiams, B., Bingham, S., Shimeld, S., 2015. Corporate governance,
the GFC and independent directors. Manag. Audit. J 30 (4/5),
324--345.
atim, P., Kent, P., Clarkson, P., 2006. Governance structures, eth-
nicity, and audit fees of Malaysian listed ﬁrms. Manag. Audit. J.
21 (7), 757--782.
ermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a
small board of directors. J. Financ. Econ. 40, 185--211.
attoni, A., Cuomo, F., 2008. Why adopt codes of good governance?
A comparison of institutional and efﬁciency perspectives. Corp.
Gov. Int. Rev. 16 (1), 1--15.
